Survey of Recent Developments in Third Circuit Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, the Law Review hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interesting
changes in significant areas ofpractice.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-CONSISTENT WITH THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, A COURT CAN ORDER AN ADMIT"ED SEXUAL
OFFENDER TO SUBMIT TO AN HIV TEST UNDER THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT-United States v. Ward, 131 F.3d 335 (3d Cir.

1997).
On the evening of December 4, 1995, the defendant-appellant,
David J. Ward, kidnapped a twenty-four-year-old woman while she
was working at a Marriott Courtyard Hotel in New Jersey. See United
States v. Ward, 131 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 1997). Ward jumped the
woman from behind, bound both her hands and feet, and brought
her to his truck that was parked in a nearby wooded area. That night
Ward sexually assaulted his victim and then left the state with her.
During the next three days, Ward sexually assaulted the victim on
numerous occasions. On December 7, in Indianapolis, the victim
managed to escape after she was left alone in the defendantappellant's truck. See id. at 337-38. Upon escape, she contacted the
police. See id. at 338. Ward fled in his truck but the police apprehended him a short time later in Springfield, Illinois.
On January 30, 1996, a grand jury in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey indicted Ward for violating 18
U.S.C. § 1201, a federal kidnapping statute that addresses the sexual
assault of a victim. See id. Ward eventually pled guilty to this charge.
See id. The court then ordered Ward to submit to a blood test to determine the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),
which causes AIDS. See id. In determining Ward's sentence, the district court noted that under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
a criminal's sentence may be increased based upon prior convictions
for similar crimes. See id. In 1983, a Minnesota state court convicted
Ward of sexually assaulting a victim at knife point; this prior conviction for a similar crime led to Ward's lengthy sentence of 720
months imprisonment for the current crime. See id. Ward subsequently appealed the lower court's decision, arguing that the court
erred in ordering him to submit to an HIV test and in increasing his
sentence based on the 1983 Minnesota conviction. See id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that ordering an HIV test does not violate a sexual offender's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
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although the court also held that the district court should have relied on the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) rather than relying
on its inherent power to order the test. See id. at 337. Accordingly,
the appellate court remanded the case to the district court to make
the factual findings required by VAWA to determine the permissibility of ordering an HIV test. See id. The Third Circuit also held that
the 720-month sentence was appropriate and that the district court
correctly considered the previous sexual assault conviction. See id at
343.
Judge Rosenn, writing for a unanimous court, initially discussed
the conflict between the two versions of VAWA and the district
court's reliance on its inherent authority to order an HIV test. See id.
The judge noted that the district court did not rely on VAWA because of an inconsistency between the codification and the version of
VAWA contained in the Statutes at Large. See id. at 338. The court
observed that VAWA empowers district courts to order criminal defendants charged with particular offenses specified in subsection (a)
to submit to an HIV test. See id. at 339. The Third Circuit noted,
however, that the codified version of VAWA fails to mention which
individuals the court can order to submit to a blood test and only
lists the word "omitted" under subsection (a). See id On the other
hand, the appellate court explained, the version of VAWA contained
in the Statutes at Large specifies those individuals who should be required to submit to an HIV test. See id Accordingly, Judge Rosenn
remarked, the district court held that the codified version, which it
erroneously believed trumped the Statutes at Large version, was void
for failure to list the persons the court could require to submit to a
blood test. See id Therefore, the judge stated, the district court reasoned that it could not use VAWA and had to rely instead on its inherent power to order an HIV test. See id at 338.
The Third Circuit next corrected the district court by citing to
authority that holds that a Statutes at Large version trumps the codified version of an act when the two conflict. See id. at 339-40 (citing
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983)).
Judge Rosenn proclaimed that VAWA is valid because the Statutes at
Large version specifies the people that the court can ordei to submit
to a blood test. See id at 339. The Third Circuit therefore (1) ruled
that the district court should not have relied, on its inherent authority and (2) remanded the case for the lower court to make the factual findings required by VAWA and to determine the appropriateness of ordering an HIV test. See id at 337.
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The court then addressed Ward's claim that, regardless of
whether the court order results from VAWA or a court's inherent
power, a compelled HIV test violates his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See id, at 340.
Judge Rosenn commented that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
only unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. Finding that the
compelled HIV test is clearly a search under the Fourth Amendment,
the judge indicated that the only issue was its reasonableness. See id.
The Third Circuit determined that a search conducted according to
the procedures specified in VAWA could not be unreasonable. See
id. The appellate court noted that VAWA provides an individual with
more protection than that provided in the Fourth Amendment. See
id,. Under VAWA, the court observed, a blood test is tolerated only if
the accused is "charged with a sexual assault that poses a risk of
transmitting HIV, there has been a probable cause determination
that the subject of the search committed the assault, the victim requested the test, and the test would provide information necessary
for the victim's health." Id. at 340-41 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14011(b) (2)
(1995)). Further, Judge Rosenn remarked, the accused must receive
notice that the victim has asked for a test and must be provided with
the opportunity to oppose the order. See id, at 341 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 14011(b) (1) (1995)). Lastly, the judge observed, the results of the
test are kept confidential with only limited disclosure. See id. (citing
42 U.S.C. § 14011(b) (5) (1995)).
Judge Rosenn further explained that VAWA provides a great
deal of protection in that it requires probable cause that the individual committed the offense, affords the accused the opportunity to
object to the test, and mandates that the results be kept confidential
except for very limited disclosure. See id. On the other hand, the
appellate court clarified, the Fourth Amendment requires probable
cause, but does not give an individual the opportunity to object before the search is conducted and does not require the government to
keep the results confidential. See id. The Third Circuit explained
that a compelled HIV test ordered under VAWA does not violate an
individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
because of the protection afforded by VAWA. See id.
Next, the court rejected Ward's argument that the government
could not meet the "special needs" test required before testing his
blood and thereby violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See id.
Judge Rosenn explained that a demonstration of "special needs" that
outweighs the intrusion on an individual's legitimate expectation of
privacy obviates the need for a warrant or individualized suspicion.
See id. at 342. The judge held that the government did not need to
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show "special needs," but could easily meet the burden if required.
See id. at 341. In the present case, the Third Circuit remarked, the
government had a strong "special need" to order the test. See id at
341, 342. For example, the appellate court observed, the government can order the test in order to inform the victim of the results,
which will either give the victim peace of mind or allow the victim to
obtain treatment as early as possible. See id, at 342. Judge Rosenn
commented that the invasion on an individual's expectation of privacy is minimal considering the risk that such individual has posed to
the victim. See id The judge proclaimed that ordering the test without a "special needs" hearing is therefore permissible because it is
clear that "special needs" exist that outweigh the invasion of privacy.
See id.
Finally, the court addressed Ward's contention that the court
erred in considering his prior criminal conviction in sentencing. See
id. The Third Circuit explained that the United States Sentencing
Guidelines permit a longer sentence if the defendant's criminal history includes a previous sentence for conduct similar to the instant
offense. See id. Judge Rosenn noted that the district court increased
Ward's offense level by two levels because of his 1983 conviction for
sexual assault. See id In fact, the judge recognized, Ward's counsel
admitted at trial that Ward met the criteria for an upward departure
in sentencing based on his prior conviction. See id, The Third Circuit held that the district court acted within the guidelines and
within its discretion in increasing the sentence based on the prior
conviction. See id. at 342, 343.
The Third Circuit used sound reasoning in its opinion and
reached very important, appropriate conclusions. It is clear that a
compelled HIV test ordered under VAWA does not violate an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. VAWA implements strict guidelines to ensure that an individual's rights are respected. In fact, the
probable cause determination, the opportunity to oppose the test
prior to its administration, and the limited disclosure requirements
provide more protection than that required by the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Third Circuit acted wisely in requiring the test to
be ordered under VAWA as opposed to allowing a court to rely on its
inherent power. If a court could order a test based on its inherent
power, then the Fourth Amendment protection provided by VAWA
would disappear and a person's Fourth Amendment rights would be
jeopardized. Also, challenges to these tests will be greatly reduced or
eliminated by requiring the court to look at the criteria in VAWA,
which is deemed to comply with the Fourth Amendment, as opposed
to relying on its inherent power. It was also prudent to uphold the
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legality of the extended prison sentence. The district court acted
within its discretion, and it is good policy to be tougher on secondtime sexual offenders in an attempt to dissuade future incidences.
Steven leischer

EMPLOYMENT LAW-SEXUAL HARASSMENT-A POLICE OFFICER
ACTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW FOR PURPOSES OF 42 U.S.C. §
1983 WHEN HE SEXUALLY HARASSES A COWORKER WHOSE SHIFT HE
SUPERVISES, EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER LACKS ANY AUTHORIY TO
HIRE, FIRE, OR MAKE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS REGARDING THE

COWORKER-Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20 (3d Cir.
1997).
Plaintiff-appellant, Cheryl Bonenberger, was employed by the
Plymouth Township Police Department as a dispatcher from February 1993 until April 1994, when she quit due to alleged sexual harassment by her acting supervisor, Sergeant Joseph La Penta. See
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 F.3d 20, 22 (3d Cir. 1997). Although Sergeant Carbo evaluated Bonenberger's work and had the
power to hire and fire her, when Carbo was not present La Penta was
responsible for supervising Bonenberger and other dispatchers by
arranging their duties and determining their break schedules. See id
at 22, 23 n.3. Thus, when the other supervisors were off duty, La
Penta alone had control over the dispatchers. See id at 22.
Plaintiff-appellant alleged that she was consistently accosted by
La Penta while at work and had to endure unwelcome sexual touchings such as buttock pinching and breast fondling. Several other
members of the police department allegedly witnessed the incidents
of harassment, including Sergeant Carbo, whose duty it was to investigate such behavior. See id at 26, 27 n.7. On one occasion, while
Bonenberger was having a conversation with Sergeant Carbo and although she protested, La Penta touched Bonenberger's breasts. See
id. at 26. Sergeant Carbo's only reaction was to smile. Later, La
Penta grabbed Bonenberger's buttocks in front of three other officers, including Sergeant Galetti, who was also responsible for investigating incidents of harassment. See id at 26, 27 n.7. This incident
was confirmed by the police department's own internal investigation.
See id at 22. Shortly after Sergeant Galetti witnessed La Penta's advances, the police department modified its sexual harassment policy
to protect dispatchers. See id at 26-27.
Bonenberger brought both federal and state law claims in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
against the Plymouth Township Police Department, Plymouth Town-
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ship, and Sergeant La Penta. See id. at 22. Specifically, Bonenberger
asserted that La Penta violated her rights to equal protection of the
law, both officially and as an individual, and that the police department also violated those rights by its failure to discipline La Penta.
See id. at 23. The plaintiff-appellant further claimed that the police
department violated her rights under Title VII in failing (1) to stem
La Penta's quid pro quo behavior and (2) to reform the hostile work
environment. See id. Moreover, Bonenberger charged the sergeant
with intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery. See id.
Finally, Bonenberger brought a claim against the police department
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. See id.
The district court granted the motions of the defendantsappellees for summary judgment on each of the federal law claims.
See id. at 22-23. The court reasoned that because La Penta did not
have the authority to hire or fire Bonenberger, he was not acting under color of state law and thus could not be liable for a § 1983 claim.
See id. at 23. The district court also decided that the police department was not liable under § 1983 because it adequately trained and
disciplined La Penta by both maintaining a sexual harassment policy
and providing regular training to prevent such behavior. See id. at
25. Finally, the district court announced that Bonenberger's Title
VII claim had no merit because the respondeat superior element was
not met. See id. at 26. Upon the resolution of all claims for which
the district court held original jurisdiction, the state law claims were
dismissed because the district court refused to entertain supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See id. at 23 & n.1.
Bonenberger subsequently appealed the decision granting summary
judgment of the federal claims as well as dismissal of the state law
claims. See id. at 22-23.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, examining the record de novo, reversed in part and affirmed in part. See
id. at 23. The appellate court reversed the order granting summary
judgment for the § 1983 claim against Sergeant La Penta, holding
that a police officer acts under color of state law when he sexually
harasses a coworker whose shift he supervises, even though the officer lacks any authority to hire, fire, or make employment decisions
regarding the coworker. See id. at 22, 23. The Third Circuit also reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment to the
police department for the Title VII hostile work environment claim
and reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs state law claims. See id. at 23,
29. Finally, the court affirmed the orders granting summary judgment regarding the Title VII claim of quid pro quo harassment and
the § 1983 claim against the police department. See id.
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Judge Lewis, writing for a unanimous court, first analyzed the
plaintiffs claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id at 23. The
judge began by delineating what is required to maintain a right of
action under § 1983. See id The court explained that liability hinges
upon state action; harassment without color of state law empowering
the perpetrator fails to meet § 1983 requirements. See id In essence,
the Third Circuit elaborated, a § 1983 claim is about abuse of state
authority through a supervisory position. See id at 24. The court
noted, however, that simply being a state employee and committing
a tort on duty does not suffice; official authority must be exercised.
See id

Based on this discussion, the Third Circuit determined that
Sergeant La Penta, although not technically Bonenberger's supervisor, could be held liable for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id.
The court emphasized the degree of control that the defendantappellee exercised over the plaintiff-appellant when no other supervisors were present, noting that disobedience on Bonenberger's part
would have resulted in insubordination and would have been
grounds for discipline. See id. Judge Lewis distinguished the instant
fact pattern from cases relied on by the trial court that addressed
similar situations. See id In one case, the court wrote, the dispatchers were employed by a private company and not by the police department itself, so that the harassing police officers did not wield any
authority over them. See id. (citing Woodward v. Worland, 977 F.2d

1392 (10th Cir. 1992)). The Third Circuit found another case where
the officers were of the same rank to be equally inapposite. See id
(citing Rouse v. City of Milwaukee, 921 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Wis. 1996)).
Unlike either of those cases, the court reasoned, La Penta was the
equivalent of Bonenberger's supervisor and utilized such authority to
harass her. See id.
Judge Lewis noted that to hinge arguments of authority on the
label of being a supervisor would create a "perverse incentive" for
governments to create supervisors without titles in order to avoid liability. See id. at 25. Substantively, the judge wrote, such adherence
to form over function would defeat the purpose of the statutory protections. See id. Finally, the Third Circuit created a test for determining who acts under color of state law, writing that, when the state
"places an official in the position of supervising a lesser-ranking employee and empowers him or her to give orders which the subordinate may not disobey without fear of formal reprisal, that official
wields sufficient authority to satisfy the color of law requirement of
42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 24-25. Applying this principle, the appellate
court determined that Sergeant La Penta could be considered
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Bonenberger's supervisor and thus reversed the grant of summary
judgment in the sergeant's favor. See id, at 25.
The Third Circuit continued the § 1983 analysis by rejecting
Bonenberger's argument that the police department failed properly
to train and discipline its members. See id. The court agreed with
the district court's decision that the Plymouth Police Department
did not act with the "deliberate indifference" that is required for §
1983 to apply. See id Judge Lewis noted that a municipality will only
be liable if supervisors both know of the harassment and act in such
a way as to encourage the employee's behavior. See id Thus, the
judge wrote, because the Plymouth Police Department maintained a
sexual harassment policy that included training for all officers, including Sergeant La Penta, the district court's grant of summary
judgment was appropriate. See id.
Judge Lewis next addressed Title VII issues, beginning with
Bonenberger's claim of a hostile work environment against the Plymouth Police Department. See id, Addressing one of the elements
for a prima facie case of sexual harassment, the Third Circuit determined that respondeat superior liability exists where the state entity
knows of the harassment and does not take sufficient remedial
measures against it. See id, at 26. In this case, the court reasoned,
Bonenberger's direct supervisor, Sergeant Carbo, had actual knowledge of the harassment by La Penta and implicitly approved of it by
taking no remedial action against him. See id, Judge Lewis explained
that in granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court
focused solely on the police department's investigation and on the
letter of reprimand issued to La Penta after Bonenberger left. See id
The judge found the lower court's analysis to be incomplete. See ie
The court emphasized the differences between Bonenberger's account of the harassment and that of the police department's and determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to Title
VII liability. See id at 27. The Third Circuit further elaborated that
merely having a sexual harassment policy in place, without a grievance procedure, is not enough to avoid liability for a hostile work
environment. See i,
Finally, the court examined the issue of quid pro quo sexual
harassment. See id Judge Lewis reiterated the traditional view of
quid pro quo harassment, which normally entails some threat of job
loss or decisionmaking based on submission vel non to the harassment. See id, In this case, the judge explained, the plaintiffappellant knew that the defendant-appellee did not have the power
to fire her or the authority to make decisions regarding her em-
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ployment, even if he made statements to that effect. See id at 27-28.
More specifically, the appellate court noted that La Penta never suggested that Bonenberger's employment depended on accepting his
sexual advances, and thus no exchange of sex for ajob occurred. See
id at 28. Although the plaintiff-appellant proposed a creative theory
of quid pro quo harassment based on constructive discharge, the
Third Circuit reiterated the need for a demand for sexual favors in
return for employment. See id. Judge Lewis thus upheld the decision to dismiss the quid pro quo claim. See id
Clearly this is a difficult and conflict-prone area of the law, as
evidenced by the number of sexual harassment cases the United
States Supreme Court will be hearing this Term. On one hand, taxpayers will despise this case, as it expands the number of state employees who fit under the aegis of civil tights law. Accordingly, it is
the taxpayers who will be forced to compensate victims of harassment propagated by coworkers regardless of supervisory tides. After
all, it is never just the officer who is sued, but the deep-pockets employer as well.
Conversely, the decision is a logical progression and a boon to
women in the workplace who may be harassed by coworkers with
power but without official supervisory tides. To hold otherwise
would defeat the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which seeks to prevent
the abuse of power granted to state officials. As the court noted, to
exempt employees lacking a tide but possessing supervisory power
from the protections afforded by § 1983 would indeed be a
"perverse" effect. Sergeant La Penta clearly commanded power over
Bonenberger, and the Third Circuit made a logical, sound decision
by allowing the plaintiff-appellant the chance to prove her case.
Nicole Hubefeld

EMPLOYMENT LAW-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-A DISABLED
EMPLOYEE WHO IS ABLE TO CONTROL HIS CONDITION WITH
MEDICATION CAN PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION ABSENT A SHOWING THAT THE EMPLOYEE MET HIS
EMPLOYER'S LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS OR THAT THE EMPLOYER
TREATED NONDISABLED EMPLOYEES MORE FAVORABLY-Matczak v.

Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., No. 97-1057, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
36159 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1997).
Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Matczak, an epileptic, began working
for the defendant-appellee, Frankford Candy and Chocolate Company (Frankford), as a maintenance supervisor in April 1993. See
Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., No. 97-1057, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 36159, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1997). Approximately
three months later, Frankford reassigned Matczak to the position of
supervisor of building maintenance. This supervisory position required Matczak to oversee the work of two mechanics and maintain
Frankford's facilities. In November of that year, Matczak suffered an
epileptic seizure while at work that required him to be hospitalized
for seventeen days. This incident marked the first time that Matczak
suffered such a seizure, as Matczak normally was able to control his
epilepsy with medication.
Matczak returned to work in December 1993. His doctor, however, limited the type of physical activities in which Matczak could
engage for the subsequent five and a half months because, during
that time, Matczak was prescribed a new type of medication. Matczak's doctor notified Frankford by letter of the restrictions imposed
on Matczak's activities. Specifically, the doctor informed Frankford
that Matczak could not work at heights, work around moving machinery, or operate a vehicle. Matczak's doctor stated that he was,
however, capable of supervising the work activity of others. See id. at
*3. When Matczak returned to work, Frankford assigned him to
tasks that were in compliance with the doctor's restrictions.
In April 1994, for reasons that remain unclear, Frankford terminated Matczak's employment and offered two conflicting explanations. First, Frankford contended that the company fired Matczak
because he failed to perform satisfactorily the tasks to which he was
assigned. Second, Frankford asserted that it eliminated Matczak's
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job because business was slow. Matczak, however, claimed that
Frankford fired him because he suffers from epilepsy and that Frankford's proffered reasons were merely pretext.
Matczak then sued his former employer in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), as well as claims for negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at *3-4. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), Frankford brought a
summary judgment motion to dismiss all claims. See id. at *4. The
district court granted Frankford's summary judgment motion and
held that (1) Matczak could not be considered disabled under the
ADA, (2) although a jury could find that Frankford regarded Matczak as disabled, Matczak nonetheless failed to prove a prima facie
case of employment discrimination, and (3) Matczak's claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress lacked merit.
See id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the district court's holding as to Matczak's disability
and discrimination claims and affirmed the district court's dismissal
of Matczak's claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at *21. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that
a disabled employee who is able to control his condition with medication can prove a prima facie case of discrimination absent a showing that the employee met the employer's legitimate expectations or
that the employer treated nondisabled employees in a more favorable manner. See id. at *2.
Judge Lewis, writing for a unanimous court, began the court's
analysis by outlining the relevant provisions of the ADA. See id. at *4.
The judge explained that under the ADA an employer is prohibited
from discriminating "'against a qualified individual with a disability'"
because of that individual's disability. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (1995)). The court offered guidance as to the meaning of
these terms by stating that under the ADA a disability is defined as
"'(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of
such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.'" Id. at *5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1995)). Furthermore, the Third Circuit noted, "'a qualified individual with a disability,'" is defined as an individual "'with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
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tions of the employment position.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8) (1995)).
The judge then examined the district court's treatment of Matczak's claims under the aforementioned provisions of the ADA. See id.
Judge Lewis first observed that Matczak sought the ADA's protection
because his epileptic condition is a physical impairment that substantially limits major life activities. See id. The court added that, in
the alternative, Matczak argued that Frankford regarded him as having a life-limiting impairment. See id. The Third Circuit pointed out
that Matczak did not claim that his work performance met Frankford's expectations or that Frankford treated nondisabled employees
better than it treated disabled employees. See id.
Judge Lewis next criticized the district court's conclusions regarding Matczak's claims. See id. at *5-6. Specifically, the judge denounced the district court's reasoning that Matczak could not be
considered disabled because his physical impairment did not substantially limit significant life activities. See id. The court further
noted that the district court did not consider the impairment to be
either permanent or severe because the condition was expected to
last no longer than six months. See id. at *6. Moreover, the court
criticized the district court's dismissal of Matczak's alternative argument that Frankford regarded him as disabled. See id. Even though
the district court conceded that a jury could find that Matczak was
regarded as disabled, the appellate court explained, the trial court
dismissed Matczak's argument because he failed to prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See id.
The Third Circuit then traced the district court's analysis concerning the elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See id. Judge Lewis enunciated that, according to the district
court, to prove a prima facie case of discrimination an employee
must show that the employee satisfied the employer's legitimate expectations and that the employer more favorably treated employees
who did not fall within the protected class. See id.
Judge Lewis commenced the court's substantive review of the
district court's analysis by critiquing the lower court's conclusion that
Matczak could not successfully assert that he is disabled under the
provisions of the ADA. See id. at *7. The court first addressed the
district court's determination that, because the activities in which
Matczak could engage were not significantly limited and because
such limitations were only to last a few months, Matczak's epileptic
condition did not substantially limit any major life activities. See id. at
*7-8. Judge Lewis opined that such reasoning was flawed because it
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failed to recognize that Matczak's epilepsy would not be cured within
five and a half months. See id. at *8. Rather, the court pronounced,
the five and a half months merely represented the time period during which Matczak was to take prescribed medication and restrict his
activities. See id. Moreover, the Third Circuit observed, the district
court failed to acknowledge that although Matczak could participate
in most life activities he was only able to do so by taking medication
to control his epilepsy. See id.
Judge Lewis remarked that the court would initially seek guidance from the ADA in order to determine how much weight to place
on Matczak's ability to control his disability with medication. See id.
at *8-9. The judge, however, quickly observed that the ADA does not
expressly state whether a court should consider mitigating measures
such as medication when assessing whether an impairment substantially limits an individual's major life activities. See id. Without express statutory language on point, the Third Circuit proclaimed, the
court could be guided by other sources. See id. at *9. Accordingly,
the appellate court considered the interpretive guidelines established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
See id. In assessing these guidelines, Judge Lewis instructed that such
guidelines advocate determining whether an impairment substantially limits an individual's major life activity without considering
mitigating measures such as prosthetic devices or medicines. See id.
Although the EEOC's guidelines are not binding on the court, the
judge professed that the guidelines should be afforded much deference and weight because Congress instructed the EEOC to establish
regulations with which to administer the ADA. See id. In addition to
the EEOC guidelines, the Third Circuit examined the ADA's legislative history and proclaimed that based on such history Congress did
not intend to include mitigating measures in determining disability.
See id. at *10. Therefore, the court concluded that individuals who
are able to control their disabilities with medication still fall within
the protective ambit of the ADA. See id. at *11.
As applied to this case, Judge Lewis announced that the district
court erroneously held that Matczak could not seek the protections
of the ADA because he was not considered disabled under the statute. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court stressed
that not all individuals who suffer from epilepsy should be considered disabled as some epileptics merely suffer benign symptoms of
the disease, such as minor musclejerks. See id. at *11-12. Thejudge
reiterated that the Third Circuit's holding merely states that a determination of whether Matczak is disabled is a genuine issue of ma-
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terial fact and, accordingly, should be resolved by ajury and not as a
matter of law. See id. at *12.
The appellate court next addressed Matczak's alternative claim
that he suffered discrimination because Frankford regarded him as
disabled and that therefore Frankford's proffered reasons for terminating him were pretext. See id. The court noted that the district
court's dismissal of this claim was based on the belief that Matczak
neglected to present a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See id. The district court based this conclusion, the judge observed, on Matczak's failure to offer evidence that would prove both
Frankford's satisfaction with the work Matczak performed and Frankford's favorable treatment of employees outside the protected class.
See id.

In considering a claim that an employer's proffered reason for
termination serves as pretext for an employer's discrimination, the
judge instructed, courts should employ the analytical framework set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green. See id. at *12-13 (citing 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Judge Lewis
described this framework as consisting of a three-part burdenshifting formula. See id. at *13. First, the court explained, an employee must establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. Second, the judge
enunciated, if the employee meets this burden the employer must
then present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking adverse action against the employee. See id. Finally, Judge Lewis observed, the employee must be offered the opportunity to prove that
the employer's proffered reason is in fact pretext. See id.
Based on this framework, Judge Lewis declared that the controlling issue before the court was whether the two elements that the
trial court found lacking were requisite elements of a prima facie
case of discrimination. See id. To resolve this question, the court further explained the holding in McDonnell Douglas. See id. The judge

pronounced that a prima facie case of discrimination contains four
elements under McDonnell Douglas- (1) the plaintiff falls within a
protected class, (2) the plaintiff was sufficiently qualified for the job,
(3) despite being qualified, the plaintiff was terminated, and (4) the
position remained open and the defendant sought applicants with
the same qualifications as those of the plaintiff. See id. at *13-14.
The Third Circuit cautioned, however, that the McDonnell Douglas
Court did not want this four-prong standard to serve as the dispositive test for a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at *14.
Rather, the court postulated, the elements of a prima facie case can
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differ depending on the factual situation at hand. See id. Therefore,
Judge Lewis stressed, it is impossible for the court to lay out every
possible required element of a prima facie case. See id. On the other
hand, the judge announced, the court can decide whether specific
elements must be present in every prima facie case of employment
discrimination. See id.
Next, the Third Circuit reviewed prior case law and concluded
that the two elements the district court found lacking were not required to prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
See id. at *14-19. In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the
first element that the district court found lacking-Matczak's failure
to show that his work met Frankford's legitimate expectations. See id.
at *14. The judge criticized. the district court's reliance on this element, reasoning that such a showing would require a subjective assessment of the situation. See id. It is impossible, Judge Lewis continued, for a court to evaluate whether an employee has met an
employer's legitimate expectations. See id. On the other hand, the
court postulated, a court can easily determine if an employee has satisfied certain objective standards, such as educational requirements.
See id. Accordingly, the appellate court noted that a survey of prior
case law revealed a prohibition against a requisite showing that an
employee satisfied an employer's expectations. See id. at *14-15. The
Third Circuit commented that because such a showing involves subjective evaluations, it is more appropriately left to consideration at a
later stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See id. at *15. For example, Judge Lewis professed, because subjective evaluations are
likely to hide pretext, they are more aptly analyzed at the pretext
stage. See id.
Judge Lewis then reaffirmed the district court's conclusion that
Matczak was qualified for the job because, as Frankford conceded,
Matczak's job entailed supervising others and did not require Matczak to engage in any medically prohibited activities. See id. Upon
reaching this conclusion, the judge remarked, the district court
should have ended its inquiry. See id. at *16. Once the district court
found that Matczak was objectively qualified for his job, Judge Lewis
continued, the district court should not have required the additional
proof that Matczak's work performance met Frankford's subjective
expectations. See id.
The court subsequently addressed the second element that the
district court found lacking in Matczak's prima facie case of discrimination-Frankford's favorable treatment of employees falling
outside the protected class. See id. The judge recognized the lack of
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clear guidance as to whether such favorable treatment is a requisite
element of a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. Noting the
McDonnell Douglas Court's mandate that the four-prong standard established in that case not be applied in a rigid manner, the court
pointed out that the relevant Third Circuit opinions offered conflicting guidance. See id. For instance, Judge Lewis observed, in several
cases the Third Circuit found favorable treatment to be an element
of a prima facie case of discrimination, whereas other Third Circuit
employment discrimination opinions made no mention of this element. See id. at *16-17.
The appellate court resolved this conflict by focusing on a prior
Third Circuit decision that specifically addressed the issue of favorable treatment. See id. at *18. In Olson v. General Electric Astrospace,
Judge Lewis explained, the court held that a plaintiff could use favorable treatment as one alternative to the fourth prong of the
McDonnell Douglas standard. See id. (citing Olson v. GeneralElec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996)). Thus, the judge suggested,
a plaintiff could satisfy the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas
framework by showing that the employer filled the plaintiff's position with an individual who did not fall within the plaintiff's protected category. See id. Judge Lewis reasoned that Olson therefore
proves that, by allowing favorable treatment of members outside the
protected class to serve as an alternative element to a prima facie
case of discrimination, favorable treatment can, but need not, be
present at the prima facie stage of the litigation. See id. Thus, the
judge concluded that the district court erroneously held that favorable treatment is a requisite element of a prima facie case. See id. at
*19.
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed and dismissed Matczak's
claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
See id. at *19-20. Before beginning a survey of these claims, however,
the court noted that both emotional distress claims are issues of state
law and therefore should be governed by Pennsylvania tort law. See
id. at *19. As an initial matter, Judge Lewis announced that all
claims arising out of the employment relationship should be exclusively decided pursuant to Pennsylvania's workers' compensation
statute and not by common law. See id. at *20.
Despite this acknowledgment, the court briefly considered
Matczak's emotional distress claims and enunciated the applicable
standards for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. First, Judge Lewis explained that to prove negligent infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show some form of bod-
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ily injury. See id. Although Matczak showed that he cried once a
week since the day he was fired, the court determined that such action does not constitute bodily injury. See id. As to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the judge instructed that
Matczak must prove that Frankford's conduct was either extreme or
outrageous. See id. at *20-21. Such a showing, Judge Lewis commented, is extremely rare in the employment context. See id. at *21.
Accordingly, the court concluded that, although Matczak claimed
that Frankford acted in a discriminatory manner, Frankford's conduct could not be considered either extreme or outrageous. See id.
Judge Lewis therefore upheld the district court's dismissal of Matczak's claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id.
The Third Circuit applied sound judgment to the issues at hand
and correctly ruled against affirming the dismissal of Matczak's disability and discrimination claims. Critical to Judge Lewis's astute
analysis was the court's reliance on both EEOC guidelines and legislative history to interpret an aspect of disability law upon which the
ADA is silent. Despite this silence, when an organization such as the
EEOC, charged with aiding in the administration of a federal statute,
offers the same statutory interpretation that is offered in the statute's
legislative history, courts are left with no option but to apply such an
interpretation.
Furthermore, the court correctly decided against expanding the
elements necessary to prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Proving a prima facie case of discrimination is not
meant to be an arduous task for a plaintiff; courts following the lead
established in McDonnell Douglas require little proof at the prima facie stage of litigation. Therefore, requiring a plaintiff to show that
he satisfied his employer's legitimate expectations and that his employer treated employees outside the employee's protected class
more favorably lacks merit and is unsubstantiated by case law.
Courts, however, would be wise to demand these and other significant proofs at a later stage in the litigation. Disability and discrimination cases have become a type of "cottage industry" in this
country. Based on a combination of liberally-written case law and
imprudent judicial decisionmaking, employees have come to believe
that they have carte blanche to sue their employers over anything
remotely resembling issues of disability and discrimination. As a result, the workplace has or at the least threatens to become expressionless. Without a comfortable work environment, productivity declines and the nation as a whole suffers. Courts have the power to
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change this trend and therefore should seize this opportunity by
demanding significant proof from plaintiffs who claim disability and
discrimination in the workplace and by sanctioning attorneys who
clog court dockets with meritless employment claims.
Dawn Marmo

CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES-FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACTIN ORDER TO DISCHARGE ITS DUTY TO REINVESTIGATE AND CORRECT
INACCURATE INFORMATION UNDER SECTION 611(A) OF THE FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING ACT, A CONSUMER REPORTING AGENCY SHOULD
INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY DATA IF THE AGENCY KNOWS OR SHOULD
KNOW THAT THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION MAY BE
UNRELIABLE AND THE COST OF INVESTIGATING IS LESS THAN THE
POTENTIAL HARM THAT REPORTING INACCURATE INFORMATION MAY
CAUSE THE CONSUMER-Cushman v. Tram Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220

(3d Cir. 1997).
In 1993, someone using the identifying information of plaintiffappellant, Jennifer Cushman, applied for and received three credit
cards under her name. See Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d
220, 222 (3d Cir. 1997). This unknown person, who may have been a
member of Cushman's Pennsylvania household, charged a total of
approximately $2400 to these cards between 1993 and 1994 without
Cushman's knowledge. Cushman was at that time a permanent resident of Pennsylvania but was attending college in Vermont. In 1994,
a bill collector informed the plaintiff-appellant that Trans Union
Corporation (TUC) would be publishing a consumer credit report
denoting that Cushman was delinquent on her payments to the
three credit grantors. Cushman then wrote to TUC notifying the
agency that she had neither requested nor used those cards and suggested that the three cards had been obtained fraudulently by a third
party. Cushman did not contact the credit grantors.
A TUC clerk conducted an investigation that consisted of contacting the credit grantors to compare their respective records regarding Cushman's personal information and inquiring as to
whether Cushman had requested opening a fraud investigation with
these creditors. TUC's investigation revealed that Cushman's identifying information in the TUC report matched that in two of the
creditors' files and that Cushman had not reported the fraud to the
credit grantors. TUC therefore retained two delinquency entries in
Cushman's credit report concerning those creditors. TUC was unable initially to contact the third credit grantor to verify the information, so this entry was deleted from Cushman's credit report. TUC's
clerks who are responsible for performing these investigations are
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paid $7.50 an hour and are generally expected to complete ten investigations per hour. TUC subsequently sent Cushman an updated
report containing two of the three delinquent entries and allowed
her to submit a form that would cause a special handling statement
to be placed on her report.
Cushman responded to TUC with a second letter in which she
repeated her complete disagreement with the facts in the report and
offered to submit affidavits stating that the reported delinquencies
were not hers. TUC then conducted another investigation identical
to the initial one, but nevertheless retained the delinquency entries
on Cushman's report. TUC never described its reinvestigation procedures to Cushman. After Cushman filed suit, TUC verified the delinquency information with the third credit grantor and reinserted
this entry on Cushman's credit report.
Several months later, Cushman disputed the delinquencies with
all three credit grantors for the first time. One of the creditors compared Cushman's handwriting to that on the credit application, and
each of the three creditors ultimately concluded that the cards were
fraudulently obtained. TUC then deleted the entries from plaintiffappellant's credit report.
Cushman initiated this action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging defamation, and
negligent and willful failure to reinvestigate the delinquent entries in
violation of sections 611 (a), 616, and 617 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the State of Vermont's FCRA. See id. After deleting the entries from Cushman's report, TUC moved for summary
judgment. See id. The district court denied this motion and stated
that the relevant inquiry was whether TUC could have concluded
that the accounts were fraudulently opened by reasonably investigating the matter. See id. at 222, 226. The court, however, sua sponte
granted TUC judgment as a matter of law on all claims after Cushman presented her case. See id. at 222-23. Cushman subsequently
appealed. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision. See id. at 221, 226.
The Third Circuit held that a consumer credit reporting agency's
duty to reinvestigate inaccurate information may entail independently verifying the accuracy of information provided by a subscriber.
See id. at 225. Furthermore, the court held that whether the agency
is required to go beyond its initial source of information depends on
two factors. See id. The court identified the first factor to be whether
the consumer has notified the agency or the agency knows or should
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know that the original source may be unreliable. See id. The appellate court defined the second factor to be the cost of independently
verifying the accuracy of the original source as compared to the potential harm that reporting inaccurate information could cause the
consumer. See id. The court concluded that the trier of fact must
weigh these two factors to determine whether a consumer credit reporting agency adequately discharged its duty to reinvestigate inaccurate information. See id. at 225-26.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Cowen commenced the
analysis by reviewing the FCRA's language and observing that the
statute's purpose is to ensure that consumer reporting agencies
adopt reasonable procedures to report credit information in a manner that is fair to the consumer. See id. at 223. The court then rejected TUC's contention that subsections (b) and (c) of the FCRA
provide the only remedy to consumers who dispute the accuracy of
information in their credit reports and decided that Cushman had a
cause of action under section 611 (a) of the FCRA. See id.
The Third Circuit explained that subsections (b) and (c) allow a
consumer to add a statement in his or her credit report explaining
the nature of a disagreement under subsection (a) when the dispute
has not been resolved between the consumer and the agency. See id.
Relying on cases from other circuits, Judge Cowen asserted that the
remedy under subsections (b) and (c) is triggered only after a subsection (a) reinvestigation has been performed but fails to resolve
the dispute. See id. Accordingly, the judge concluded that when a
consumer's complaint is that the agency has not even conducted a
reasonable reinvestigation section 611(a) authorizes a separate
claim. See id. at 223-24.
Next, the court turned to the critical issue of the scope of a
credit reporting agency's duty to reinvestigate alleged inaccurate information in a consumer's credit report. See id. at 224-26. Addressing TUC's claim that section 611(a) merely requires an agency to
confirm the verity of the disputed information with the source that
provided it, the Third Circuit noted that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have already considered and rejected this contention. See id. at
224 (citing Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286-87 (7th Cir.
1994); Stevenson v. TRW, Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Judge Cowen agreed with the Seventh Circuit that once an agency is
notified that a consumer disputes information in her credit report
the reasonable reinvestigation requirement of section 611(a) may
obligate the agency independently to verify the disputed information. See id. (citing Henson, 29 F.3d at 286-87). Thejudge reasoned
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that, although it would be too burdensome to require an agency initially to verify all information, once it is notified of a dispute, the
agency could target its resources to conduct a more efficient and
thorough investigation. See id. The court posited that because the
consumer will already have pinpointed the claimed inaccuracy the
agency would then have to reinvestigate only that piece of disputed
information. See id at 225. Moreover, the Third Circuit observed, a
cost-benefit analysis of requiring the agency to inquire beyond the
original source will probably weigh in favor of the consumer. See id.
Adopting the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, the Third Circuit
postulated that in a reinvestigation scenario the plain language of
section 611 (a) requires a credit reporting agency to bear some of the
responsibility for evaluating the verity of information provided by the
initial source. See id. at 224 (citing Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293).
Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, Judge Cowen determined that in
cases where fraud is alleged the FCRA places the burden to investigate squarely on the reporting agency and does not require the consumer to resolve the dispute with the credit grantor. See id. (citing
Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293). Citing congressional intent as evinced
through the FCRA, the judge elaborated that credit reporting agencies that reap profits by collecting and disseminating credit information bear "'grave responsibilities'" to guarantee the accuracy of such
information. See id. The appellate court proffered that agencies
must do more than merely parrot information provided by other
sources. See id. at 225.
Further rejecting TUC's contention that section 611(a) does
not require it independently to verify information, the Third Circuit
enunciated that TUC's interpretation would merely replicate the obligations imposed on reporting agencies under section 611e(b). See
id. Remarking that courts should avoid interpretations that render
statutory language superfluous, the appellate court expounded that
TUC's interpretation would impermissibly render the two sections
duplicative. See id. Continuing, Judge Cowen dismissed TUC's reliance on a Second Circuit case, Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc. See
id. (citing 112 F.3d 98, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1997)). The judge distinguished Podell from this case by noting that Podell did not allege that
the scope of the consumer credit reporting agency's reinvestigation
was unreasonably narrow. See id. The Third Circuit countered that
Podell was not on point because Podell's complaint was only that the
agency had failed to inform him that a reinvestigation had occurred,
thus depriving him of the opportunity to note the dispute in his
credit file. See id.
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Concluding the court's analysis on this issue, Judge Cowen reiterated that a consumer credit reporting agency may be obliged independently to verify the accuracy of information supplied by subscribers in order to fulfill its obligation reasonably to reinvestigate
disputed information pursuant to section 611 (a) of the FCRA. See id
(citing Henson, 29 F.3d at 287). The judge further held that two factors must be considered to determine whether the scope of the
agency's duty to investigate broadens beyond its original source of
information. See id. First, the court asserted that this expanded duty
may arise if the reporting agency knows or should know that its
source of information is unreliable or if the consumer has notified
the agency that its source may be inaccurate. See id. Second, the appellate court imposed a duty to weigh the cost of independently verifying the information of the original source against the potential
harm that may befall the consumer as a result of inaccurately reported information. See id. Moreover, the Third Circuit emphasized
that the trier of fact must weigh these factors to determine whether
the agency complied with the FCRA. See id. at 225-26.
Reviewing the proceedings in the district court, the Third Circuit concluded that Cushman presented sufficient evidence to enable ajury to render a verdict in her favor. See id. at 226. The appellate court hypothesized that a jury could have determined that TUC
was on notice that Cushman claimed the accounts were fraudulently
opened by a third party. See id. Furthermore, the court proclaimed,
a jury could have found that TUC therefore should have known that
the three credit grantors were not reliable to the extent that Cushman had not informed them of the fraud. See id. Continuing, Judge
Cowen theorized that a reasonable jury could have decided that the
seventy-five cents expended by TUC for the reinvestigation was too
little when compared to the harm that reporting the wrongful information would cause Cushman. See id. Reiterating that the district
court erred in arrogating this role, the judge reversed the district
court's grant ofjudgment as a matter of law. See id.
Next, the Third Circuit reinstated Cushman's claim for punitive
damages under section 611(n) of the FCRA and remanded to the
district court to determine whether TUC's alleged violation of section 611 (a) was willful. See id. at 227. Determining the standard for
willful noncompliance, Judge Cowen declined to adopt the Fifth Circuit's approach, which limits punitive damage awards to cases of willful misrepresentations or concealments. See id. at 226-27 (citing Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 294).
The judge, however, stated that a
defendant's actions "must be on the same order as willful concealments or misrepresentations." Id. at 227. The court postulated that
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punitive damages may be awarded when an agency adopts its reinvestigation procedures with either knowledge or reckless disregard that
such procedures violate consumers' rights under the FCRA. See id.
Similarly, the Third Circuit reinstated Cushman's claims for violations of Vermont's FCRA and defamation. See id. at 227-30. Analyzing the Vermont FCRA claims, the court first concluded that a jury
could have found that Cushman was a resident of Vermont and
therefore entitled to the protections of Vermont's FCRA. See id. at
228-29. Next, Judge Cowen reversed and remanded the district
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on Cushman's claim
that, under Vermont's FCRA, TUC failed to notify her promptly that
the delinquency entry of the third creditor had been reinserted after
she filed suit. See id. at 229. The judge ordered ajury determination
of whether TUC's notification to Cushman's attorneys during discovery was sufficiently prompt. See id. The appellate court also revived Cushman's claim that TUC failed to provide her with any description of its reinvestigation policy in contravention of Vermont's
FCRA, because there was sufficient evidence that TUC did violate
this provision of the statute. See id.
Finally, the court examined Cushman's defamation claim. See
id. at 229-30. Observing that the district court decided that Cushman failed to produce any evidence of malice, which is required to
avoid the FCRA's preemption of state defamation causes of action,
the appellate court remanded for a redetermination of this issue. See
id. at 229. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit concluded
its analysis by determining that Cushman satisfied the publication
element of her defamation claim because TUC published the erroneous information to two of the credit grantors and a bill collector.
See id. at 230. Accordingly, Judge Cowen declared that the district
court also erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to TUC on
Cushman's defamation claim. See id.
The Third Circuit has broadened the duties of consumer credit
reporting agencies regarding reinvestigations. Given the importance
of credit reports, it is equitable to place the burden of ensuring the
accuracy of the information reported on the agencies that profit
from disseminating credit data. However, identity theft is probably
not the type of inaccurate information for which Congress intended
to penalize credit agencies. Two aspects of the court's decision will
unduly hinder both credit reporters and credit grantors in cases of
identity theft.
First, reporting agencies are now subject to expanded duties to
investigate otherwise accurate information when a consumer fails to
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notify the credit source that his identifying information was improperly used. A consumer should at least be required to notify credit
grantors of alleged fraud before the creditor or the agency is
charged with incurring investigation expenses for the protection of
the consumer.
Second, the court's reading of FCRA's remedy provisions will
prevent credit grantors from obtaining information that could warn
them to verify an applicant's identity before granting credit. The
explanatory statement provided for in sections 611(b) and (c) is the
best remedy in cases of identity theft. So long as an agency does not
factor this information in the consumer's credit rating, retaining this
information would put potential credit grantors on notice without
harming the consumer. This would ultimately benefit all credit consumers by reducing credit card fraud. Unfortunately, this decision
will prevent creditors from obtaining this information.
Elizabeth McCrae

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO A UNANIMOUSJURY VERDICT-

A TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INFORM JURORS THAT THEY MUST
AGREE UNANIMOUSLY ON BOTH THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONTINUING
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE PREDICATE OFFENSES AND THE IDENTrIY OF
THOSE OFFENSES VIOLATES A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT AND THEREFORE

CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR-United States v. Russell, No. 967760, 1998 WL 12543 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 1998).
Defendant-appellant James Russell was involved in an intricate
and profitable drug distribution scheme. See United States v. Russell,
No. 96-7760, 1998 WL 12543, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 1998). The
scheme involved pooling his funds with three associates, using those
funds to purchase large quantities of cocaine from sources in New
York, and then distributing the drugs to dealers in Pennsylvania.
Russell was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on the following three counts: (1) conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), (2) conspiracy to
distribute controlled substances, and (3) money laundering. Russell's codefendants turned state's evidence and testified against him
at trial.
In order to prevail on the CCE charge, the government was required to prove, among other things, that Russell committed a drugrelated felony under 21 U.S.C. § 13, subchapter I or II, and that this
felony "was part of a 'continuing series of violations' of the subchapter." Id. at *2 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2) (1981)). Pursuant to
an earlier Third Circuit decision, the trial judge was required to instruct the jurors that they must agree unanimously on which three or
more drug-related felonies comprised the continuing series. See id.
at *3 (citing United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir.
1996)).
After issuing a charge that failed to include a specific unanimity
instruction, the trial judge held a conference with counsel to determine whether there were any objections to the instructions. See id. at
*4, *5. Russell's attorney made two objections, neither of which related to the requirement of specific unanimity on CCE predicate offenses. See id. at *13 (Alito, J., concurring and dissenting). After
twice confirming that counsel had no additional objections to the in-
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structions, the trial judge engaged Russell's attorney in a discussion
of whether Edmonds required that the jurors be given a special verdict
page. See id. at *14. The district court decided not to provide a special verdict sheet and this decision was not challenged by the defendant-appellant on appeal. See id.
The jury found Russell guilty of both the CCE charge and the
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances charge. See id. at *1.
Russell appealed his conviction on a number of grounds, the main
one claiming that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury with
respect to the requirement for specific unanimity on the CCE count.
See id. Russell claimed that this failure deprived him of his Sixth
Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict. See id.
In reversing Russell's conviction on the CCE charge, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a trial court's
failure to inform jurors that they must agree unanimously on both
the existence of the CCE predicate offenses and the identity of those
offenses violates a defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous
verdict and thus constitutes reversible error. See id. at *4, *9. The
court also held that, when both the substance and context of a conversation between a judge and an attorney are sufficient to alert the
judge to an objection and the basis for it, the objection is properly
preserved for appeal. See id. at *5, *6.
Writing for the majority, Judge Lewis enunciated the rationale
for requiring a specific unanimity instruction in certain limited situations. See id. at *3. The judge explained that such instructions are
required when "'the complexity of the case, or other factors, creates
the potential that the jury will be confused.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987)). The purpose of the
instruction, the court continued, is to ensure substantial juror
agreement at each step in the determination of complex cases. See
id. Unanimity, stressed the majority, is a crucial component in federaljury trials. See id.
Relying on recent precedent, the court noted that CCE prosecutions are precisely the kinds of cases where general unanimity instructions are insufficient. See id. (citing Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 822).
Under the CCE statute, reiterated Judge Lewis, the charge "must direct the jury to agree unanimously on which of the alleged violations
constitute the continuing series." Id. (emphasis added). The judge
found that while the charge in Russell's case did instruct the jurors
of the requirement to agree unanimously on the existence of three or
more narcotics violations it failed to apprise the jurors of the requirement for unanimous agreement on the identity of those of-
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fenses. See id at *4. The majority conceded there was ample evidence of Russell's involvement in several drug-related felonies and,
consequently, that the jurors may have all agreed on the identity of
three or more predicate offenses. See id The problem, the appellate
court countered, is that the instruction allowed the jurors to convict
Russell even if they did not agree on which offenses comprised the
continuing series. See id.
The majority next addressed the requirements for preserving
arguments for appeal. See id. at *4-9. The court first traced the sequence of events surrounding the issuance of the jury instructions in
the case. See id. at *5. Judge Lewis recounted that the trial judge
conferred with counsel in an on-the-record setting specifically to
hear any objections to the charge. See id. The judge observed that it
was during this meeting that Russell's attorney alerted the district
judge that the instructions did not comply with Edmonds. See id. at
*6.
The Third Circuit then acknowledged that Russell's lawyer did
not explicitly object to the general unanimity instruction. See id at
*5. Judge Lewis argued, however, that the purpose of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 30, which deals with the preservation of issues
for appeal, is not to mandate strict adherence to linguistic or stylistic
formalities. See id (citing United States v. O'Neill, 116 F.3d 245, 247
(7th Cir. 1997)). Preserving an issue for appeal, maintained the
judge, requires only a communication that is sufficiently specific to
notify the court of the existence of an objection and the underlying
basis for it. See id. at *6.
In finding that the defendant-appellant adequately preserved
the issue for appeal, the majority emphasized that Russell's attorney
engaged the trial judge in a lengthy debate over the validity of the
charge in light of Edmonds. See id. The majority determined that the
context of the meeting-an on-the-record discussion of possible objections-and the request for a special verdict page sufficiently
alerted the trial judge "that Russell believed ... the instruction was
incorrect because it lacked the requisite specificity, and that the basis
for this belief was [the Third Circuit's] decision in Edmonds." Id.
Judge Lewis therefore concluded that the trial judge must have understood that defense counsel was objecting to the charge. See id.
After ruling that the issue was properly preserved, the Third
Circuit reviewed the jury instructions under the harmless error standard of review. See id at *8. Judge Lewis explained that because the
error implicated the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous
verdict, the court may affirm the trial court "'only if the error is
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harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Molina-Guevara,96 F.3d 698, 703 (3d Cir. 1996)). The judge distinguished the present case from Edmonds, where the defendant was actually convicted of each individual offense comprising the continuing series, and decided that it would be impossible in the present
case to know conclusively that the jury was in unanimous agreement
as to the identity of the predicate offenses. See id. The court also
cited an additional basis for employing the harmless error standard-specifically, defense counsel's ninety-three pages of proposed
alternative instructions. See id. at *6. Indicating that it is unsettled
whether an alternative instruction is by itself adequate to preserve an
appeal, the Third Circuit suggested that an alternative instruction
might buttress an otherwise less-than-explicit objection. See id. at *67.
Finally, Judge Lewis opined that had the issue not been properly preserved, necessitating the use of the stricter plain error standard, the trial court's defective instruction would nonetheless have
amounted to reversible error. See id. at *7. The error was plain, the
judge indicated, because "it was 'clear' and 'obvious' from even a
cursory reading of our decision in Edmonds." Id. The majority added
without hesitation that the error affected substantial rights because
it impinged on Russell's Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous
verdict. See id.
Judge Alito agreed with the majority's decision to affirm Russell's conspiracy conviction but dissented from the reversal of the
CCE conviction. See id. at *12 (Alito,J., concurring and dissenting).
More specifically, the judge rejected the majority's finding that Russell's attorney adequately preserved an objection to the general unanimity instruction. See id. The judge asserted that the error was not
reversible under the plain error standard of review that should apply
to such a situation. See id.
Judge Alito first posited that Edmonds was wrongly decided because the CCE statute does not require any special unanimity instruction. See id. at *13 (Alito,J., concurring and dissenting). In particular, the judge cited "'conceptual tension'" between the
requirement for specific unanimity in some cases-such as predicate
felonies-and the absence of such a requirement in others-such as
CCE crimes in which the defendant must have supervised, organized,
or managed five or more identified individuals. See id. at *12 (Alito,
J., concurring and dissenting).
Turning to the core of the judge's disagreement with the major-.
ity, Judge Alito first highlighted the importance of properly preserv-
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ing objections. See id. at *13 (Alito, J., concurring and dissenting).
The judge focused on the need for finality and the enhancement of
judicial economy that results when unnecessary appeals are eliminated. See id, More importantly, explained the judge, Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 30 promotes accurate verdicts by avoiding retrials once the evidence has become impaired after long delays. See
id.
Analyzing the trial record, Judge Alito critiqued the factual basis
for the majority's finding that the trial judge was notified of an objection. See id. at *13-15 (Alito,J., concurring and dissenting). The
judge criticized the majority's decision to treat counsel's request for
a special verdict sheet as an objection to the general unanimity instruction-especially when the refusal to provide the requested form
was not challenged on appeal. See id. at *14 (Alito, J., concurring
and dissenting). Judge Alito remarked that "[b]y obscuring the important distinction between an objection to a jury instruction and a
request for a special verdict sheet, the majority, I believe, has committed a serious error." Id at *15 (Alito, J., concurring and dissenting).
Judge Alito argued that the proper standard of review is plain
error because the issue was not adequately preserved. See id. at *16
(Alito,J., concurring and dissenting). While agreeing that there was
an error, the judge disputed that it was plain. See id. at *17 (Alito, J.,
concurring and dissenting). For an instruction to be plainly erroneous, the judge instructed, it must be determined that the trial
judge's issuance was derelict. See id. (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 632 (3d Cir. 1993)). In the present
case, Judge Alito contended, the problem with the jury instruction
was simply one of incompleteness, not inaccuracy. See id. at *16
(Alito, J., concurring and dissenting). Noting the Supreme Court's
exhortation to use the plain error standard sparingly and only when
necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice, the dissent implied that
no miscarriage of justice would occur in affirming Russell's conviction. See id. at *17 (Alito, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
The majority's conclusion that convictions under the CCE statute require a specific unanimity instruction was a straightforward application of the rule announced in Edmonds and was therefore correct to that extent. AsJudge Alito pointed out, however, the majority
passed up an opportunity to resolve the "conceptual tension" between differing interpretations of two provisions of the CCE statute.
It is illogical to require jurors to agree unanimously on the identity
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of the offenses comprising the continuing enterprise while not requiring unanimity on the identity of the five or more persons the defendant is required to have managed and supervised under the statute.
The case is probably more noteworthy for its discussion of what
is necessary to preserve issues for appeal. The Third Circuit seemed
willing to stretch considerably the facts contained in the trial record
in order to find that an objection had been made. Judge Alito's argument though is more convincing, claiming that defense counsel's
request for a special verdict sheet raised a completely different point.
This is especially so when one considers that the attorney explicitly
stated, on two occasions, that he had no objections to the charge as
read. The court's willingness to find an implied objection on such
weak facts sets a very low bar and threatens to undermine severely
the sound justifications for requiring specific and timely objections-one of the oldest and most entrenched rules of trial procedure.
Finally, the majority's obiter dictum on the effect of defense counsel's proposed alternative instructions is interesting for what it suggests. The court appeared to be implying that when an objection is
less-than-explicit, a set of proposed alternative instructions may rescue the defective objection by bolstering the "explicitness" of the notice. If the court is moving towards such a sliding scale test, it weakens further the policy behind requiring specific objections.
Richard Wood

